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12.2 Critique and Theory in the History of the 
Modern Humanities 
PAUL jAY 
What role has poststructuralist literary, critical, and cultural theory played in 
the making of the humanities, particularly in the period between 1968 and the 
present, and what role should theory have going forward as we come to terms 
with the corporatization of higher education, with its stress on practical skills, 
vocational training, and on measuring concrete learning outcomes? Exploring 
these questions requires confronting - and linking - two key issues currently 
at the core of sometimes-fierce debates about the humanities in the West, and 
particularly in t he US. 
T he first issue has to do with whether or not theory since 1968 has served to 
undermine the traditional coherence of a humanities education, and the second 
has to do with how humanists and their supporters respond rn assertions the 
humanities have little value because they do not teach students practical skills. In 
the US in particular these two issues have gotten intertwined. 
I will be arguing that since theory has always been central to the humanities it 
is a mistake to argue it has somehow undermined and marginalized them. This is 
especially the case at a t ime when questions are being raised about the practical 
skills humanities students acquire, for the skill of critical thinking is at the very 
heart of an education in theory. C laims that a humanities education has no practi-
cal utility are surprisingly common. Indeed, such a claim is often worn as a badge 
of prestige by humanists themselves. For example, the well-known literary critic 
and New York Times columnist Stanley Fish has insisted that the humanities 
don't do anything, if by' do' is meant bring about effects in the world. And 
if they don't bring about effects in the world they cannot be justified ex-
cept in relation to the pleasure they give to those who enjoy them. To the 
question 'of what use are the humanities~', the only honest answer is none 
whatsoever.' 
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And Funk Donoghue, writing about the marginalization of the humanities in 
an increasingly vocation-centered university, sur renders to a dangerous fatalism. 
'Curricula change overtime: he notes, 'and the humanities simply don't have a 
place in the emergent curriculum of the twenty-first century'.' With friends like 
this the humanities do not need any enemies. 
T he failure to rise to the challenge of defending the humanities in terms 
of t he practical skills they teach is all too often a retreat into idealism. Worse 
still, it usually comes off as defeatist. It avoids the necessity of developing a 
pragmatic position in t h e face of realities that are not going to go away. Arguing 
that the humanities have gotten sidetracked by abstract, esoteric theories fails 
to recognize t hat theory is intimately related to critique, that critique has been 
at the center of debates about humanism since its inception, and that critique 
is demonstrably connected to the practical skill we sometimes too loosely call 
'critical th inking'. For t his reason, highlighting the role of theory as critique in 
the humanities is one of t he best ways to highlight the practical utility of a hu-
manities education. 
Critical Theory and the end/ ends of the humanities 
Observers who complain theory has ruined the humanities argue that from 1850 
to about 1968 the humanities developed a curr.icular and intellectual coherence 
that was successively undermined by structuralist, deconstructive, psychoana-
lytic, queer and Marxist theory, and later by multiculturalism, feminism, and the 
rise of postcolonial and cultural studies.3 This old coherence was based largely on 
an attitude of deference to canonical texts and traditional humanist ideals. It was 
connected to what the American critic Andrew Delbanco has called a curatorial 
model of scholarship and teaching.• According co this narrative, the primary role 
of the humanities was to preserve and explore a great tradition of humanist work 
in literature, philosophy, the fine arts, history, and religion, encouraging students, 
following Matthew Arnold's ideal, to study with d isinterest the best that has been 
thought and written. 
The problem with theory, from Delbanco's perspective, is that it abandoned 
deference and disinterest in favor of criticism, fracturing a coherence organized 
around great books and the ostensible pursuit of'universal truths' at t he core of 
Western humanism. The complaint about theory from this perspective is that its 
focus on difference and diversity turned our attention away from what unites us 
to what divides us. According to this narrative, difference replaced universality as 
the key principle directing the pursuit of knowledge in the humanities. Following 
this new model, the humanities turned its attention to analyzing the exclusion 
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of differences as a constitutive move in the construction of the very notion of 
a 'common humanity: and this attention led to an explosion of work across the 
d isciplines of the humanities on the importance of particular d ifferences related 
to things like culture, gender, race, and sexual orientation. It also red to what tra-
ditional humanists came co feel was a counterproductive critique of humanism 
itself, one that undermin ed the very notion of a humanities education. 
Of course traditional humanists were hardly wrong in seeing theory as a threat 
to humanism, for theorists as varied as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and 
Louis Althusser (along with French feminists such as Monique Wittig, Luce Iri-
garay, and Helene Cixou:s) often presented their work as announcing the end of 
humanist man. While humanism tended to see the human subject as a sovereign 
agent, language as a transparent medium for that agency, and truth as the product 
of a reason that transcended history, these theorists and their followers ques-
t ioned the autonomy and agency of the subject, the transparency of language, 
t he foundations of reason, and the whole idea that truth could stand outside 
history and culture as universal and foundational. The most oft-cited version of 
this idea is Foucault's declaration near the end of The Order of Things that 'man 
is neither che oldest nor che most constant problem chat has been posed for hu-
man knowledge; chat 'one can be certain that man is a recent invention ( ... ] and 
one perhaps nearing its end'.~ Derrida's critique of metaphysics, the questions he 
raises about the idea of presence, and his criticism of the equation between voice, 
reason, and the subject, was also framed as a frankly anti- or posthumanist ap-
proach to subjectivity. And the work of both Derrida and Foucault is consistent 
with that of Althusser, who insisted on the fundamentally anti-humanist orien-
tation of Marxism and argued that the putatively autonomous humanist subject 
was a product of ideology and language, a being not sovereign bm interpellated. 
From this point of view, theory's critique of humanism seemed to betray the very 
ideals upon which t he humanities were built.6 Why? Because theory substituted 
ideological critique for disinterest, made it more d ifficult to explore our common 
humanity, and seemed to fracture the curricular coherence of a humanities educa-
t ion by marginalizing t he great works of the Western tradit ion in favo r of inferior 
texts by formerly marginalized writers. 
While there is no denying how dramatically poststructuralist theory has 
transformed the humanities, it is by no means necessary to see theory as anti-hu-
manist. Indeed, as Martin Halliwell and Andrew Mously have shown,7 humanist 
t hought is too diverse a tradition to be reduced to a single line of thinking about 
human subjectivity. They question the standard narrative that contemporary crit-
ical theory constituted a 'complete rupture' with humanism. Instead, they argue 
chat the work of thinkers like Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Lacan, 
and Lyotard, ought co be seen as developing a more nuanced, self-reflexive, and 
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'rigorous theory' of rhe human. From this point of view, contemporary critical 
theory 'takes the human to be an open-ended and mu cable process: bur chis does 
not have co be seen as an anti-humanism. A 'poscfoundacionalist view of the hu-
man: suspicious of essentialist categories, is in their view an 'ethically and politi-
cally grounded humanism'.8 
I think they are right, and that it is important to recognize not simply how 
contemporary critical t heory can be understood as an attempt to productively 
modify the substance of humanist thinking, but how the kind of critical think-
ing theory performs is itself central to the tradition of humanism. The danger in 
d ismissing t heory as anti-humanist is that it runs the risk of elevating subjects 
of knowledge (call it cultural literacy) over learning how to think critica!!y about 
systems of thought, ideologies, and authority (what I would ca!! critical literacy). 
One of the most significant drawbacks of this position is that it sees objects 
of knowledge and the practice of critique in e ither/ o r terms. This problem is 
exemplified by Delbanco's distinction between curation and criticism. According 
to Delbanco, the humanities went astray when criticism overwhelmed curation, 
when theory and the critique of humanism took the place of the humanities' 
responsibility to preserve and venerate a traditional body of knowledge (and the 
seemingly timeless author ity it had) . What this point of view misses, of course, 
is the reciprocal relationship between curation and criticism, for to a significant 
degree the act of curation requires criticism, and criticism is itself a form of 
curation. 
A curator does not j ust make decisions based on quality and d istinction. He 
or she is also critically and imaginatively involved in putting together objects in 
ways that produce new relations between things and new forms of knowledge. 
Humanities scholars and educators curate by bei ng critical in this more capacious 
sense of the term. Contemporary work in the humanities is therefore curatorial 
in the best sense of the word. It both reorganizes old materials and gathers them 
together with new materials to create new perspectives on both the past and the 
present. This means theory is not a threat to the curatorial enterprise, but rather, 
is central to its inte1lectual and pedagogical vital ity. 
Because theoretical thinking has always been central in mainstream human-
ism, the distinction between preservation and critique simply does not hold up. 
Delbanco wants the great texts or art works in literature, philosophy, art history, 
or religious studies to be the primary focus of attention, but in a way that runs 
the risk of separating them off - even protecting them - from criticism. In his 
view the act of curation must always take precedlence over what he takes to be the 
counterproductive practices of criticism. My point, of course, is not to argue that 
Delbanco gets it backwards - chat the humanities ought to be all about criticism 
and t hat they ought to put curation on the back burner. My point is that the two 
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activities are interdependent. When we articulate the value of the humanities we 
need to emphasize not only the body of knowledge they preserve bur also the 
value of the forms of critique they teach, and co underscore chat critique is a prac-
t ical skill integral to both scholarly work and critical citizenship. 
Theory, critique, and the tradition of humanism 
Now, what do I mean when I invoke the word critique, and how has critique been 
central to the making of the humanities~ Let me be clear: by critique I do not 
simply mean critical th inking. The phrase 'crit ical thinking' has become a terribly 
overused catch phrase in discussions of higher education, and it is often very 
loosely defined - if it is defined at all. By critique I mean the practice of system-
atically analyzing and interrogating the constitution of conceptual categories and 
the sources of t heir authority. Critique explores h istorically and conceptually the 
development of norms t hat regulate our personal, social, and political lives to-
gether (for that matter, it explores the historical constitution of the very'we' these 
norms are supposed to protect). 
It is important to stress here that there is such a thing as critique itself- separa-
ble from particular critiques of particular discourses. And critique can be taught, 
not just particular critiques, but the activity of critique per se. Indeed, this is what 
we teach when we teach critical theory. Judith Butler, writing about Foucault's 
conception of critique, has observed that critique 
will be dependent on its objects, but its objects will in turn define the very 
meaning of critique. Further, the primary task of critique is not to evalu-
ate whether its objects - social conditions, practices, forms of knowledge, 
power, and discourse - are good or bad, valued highly or demeaned, but to 
bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself.9 
This meta-level in critique, this bringing'into relnef the very framework of evalu-
ation itself' is at the heart of the activity we call critique. 
Critique is, in this sense, at the very heart of the humanist enterprise. It in-
volves the kind of abstract, systematic thinking we associate with Kant's theory 
of the aesthetic, Hegel's dialectic, Marx's analys is of the class st ructure or the 
operations of ideology, Nietzsche's idea of the death of god, or Freud's work on 
the unconscious, or his great work, Civilization and Its Discontents. But it also in-
volves our evaluating the very frameworks of evaluation that have been employed 
to think about those critiques, including our own evaluation of those evaluations. 
Indeed, it is quite impossible to think about humanism, and thus the humani-
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ties, without thinking of rhe primary role char dissent and critique played in the 
development of Enlightenment thought, especially in terms of its radical pro-
posals about human liberty and agency, about the primacy and autonomy of the 
individual, and about th e natural or human rights everyone is ent itled to. All of 
these ideas involved a theoretical critique of the status quo. It was what human-
ism, at its very foundations, was all about. From this point of view, the criticism 
of t heory's place in the humanities makes no sense. Worse still, it seems to strike 
at the very heart of the humanist enterprise, relegating its critical vitality to the 
past. Seen this way, humanism is over, fixed, curated, and sanitized. It is worthy 
of historical study, bur not something that still lives. 
One thing that is particularly interesting about Butler's d iscussion of Fou-
cault's approach co critique is her focus on how he associates critique with virtue, 
the cultivation of which - along with an ethical sensibility - we like to associate 
with a humanities education. About his idea that 'chere is something in critique 
chat is akin to virtue' Foucault observes,'0 
virtue is most often understood either as an attribute or a practice of a sub-
ject, or indeed a quality that conditions and characterizes a certain kind of 
action or practice. It belongs to an ethics which is not fulfilled merely by 
following objectively formulated rules or laws. And virtue is not only a way 
of complying with or conforming with pre-established norms. It is, more 
radically, a critical relation to chose norms." 
This critical relation to norms, Buder emphasizes, involves 'a resistance to author-
ity', something Butler points out Foucault saw as absolutely central to Enlighten-
ment critiques of the status quo. 
Although Butler is quick to point out that most Enlightenment thinkers would 
not understand the link between critique and virtue in this kind of way, she in-
sists that 'chis resistance would not invalidate' th e link Foucault makes, for what 
he 'seeks in the characterization of the Enlightenment is precisely what remains 
"unthought" within its own terms: hence, his is a critical history' of critique." 'In 
his view', she concludes, 'critique begins with questioning the demand for absolute 
obedience and subjecting every governmental obligation imposed on subjects co 
a rational and reflective evaluacion'.'3 Foucault's connection between virtue and 
critique, of course, is aimed precisely at exposing these operations and therefore 
has the potential to be liberatory. 
Linking theory to critique, and considering its liberatory potential in the way I 
have been sketching out, underscores a key problem with conservative criticisms 
of theory. On t he one hand, the popular idea that theory has ruined t he humani-
t ies is often based on the quite accurate idea chat theory has had a lot of critical 
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things to say about humanism. Bur on the other ihand, that argument misses the 
fact that theory's critique of humanism is thoroughly consistent with the central-
ity and purpose of critique in humanism itself, and that its purpose, by and large, 
has been to ensure the ideals of liberty and agency at the heart of humanism 
are extended to everyone. For chis reason, contemporary theory - contemporary 
critique - ought not to be thought of as anti- or posthumanist, :although as we 
have seen above, some theorists like to style it that way. In my view, such terms are 
quite counterproductive. In an age when the humanities are imperiled, it makes 
little sense to use the rhetoric of anti- or posthumanism in articulating its value. 
There is no reason why theory and its critique of humanism cannot be folded into 
a positive articulation of a twenty-first-century humanism. 
Instead of seeing theory as a threat to humanism, new ways of chinking about 
the human subject, the role chat language plays in constructing reality and shap-
ing meaning and value, and how gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and 
class both shape identity and enable or circumscribe agency, ought to be seen 
as constructively rethinking and expanding traditional humanist claims about 
individuality, autonomy, liberty, and rights. In my view, contemporary forms of 
humanistic critique are, by and large, interested in helping co broaden, and diver-
sify these claims, co make che discourse of humanism more, not less legitimate. 
Although in its most radical moments, theory seemed to be announcing the end 
of man or the beginning of a poschumanisc age, it has actually represented con-
structive, forward-looking dissent from the historical limits of humanism, dissent 
chat sought to expand, correct, and broaden humanist ideals. 
Examples abound. Although, as we have seen, Foucault's remarks about the 
'end of man' have often been cited as an example of the anti-humanist orientation 
of contemporary theory, it makes more sense to see his work on the relationship 
between subjectivity, discourse, ideology, and power - along with theory's general 
critique of the idealist human subject of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century phi-
losophy - as a contribution to refining and clarifying our humanist understand-
ing of subjectivity and agency. From this point of view, contemporary theory is all 
about insuring that the !humanist guarantee of agency and rights is extended to 
everyone, not just the traditional human subject of universal man'. 
Here, of course, feminist theory becomes another, crucial example of a 
critical theory chat, while it might be presented as anti-humanist, is anything but. 
On t he one hand, feminism dissents from humanism's notion of'man', based as it 
is on the universaliz ing of a version of human nature derived by, and largely based 
on, male experience, but on the other hand feminism is linked to humanism in its 
insistence that women be accorded the same set of rights and the same kind of au-
tonomy and agency associated with traditional humanism. On the critical side, of 
course, feminist theory and history help foreground the patriarchal orientation of 
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humanism. Not simply in the trivial and quite obvious sense that virtually all of 
the early thinkers and writers associated with humanism were males whose status 
as scholars and educators was predicated on all of the privileges chat came with 
being male in a patriarchal system, privileges that were unavailable to women 
(who, more often than not, were treated as the property of men). The less obvious 
but perhaps even more important point is that the identity category of gender is 
altogether absent inside humanist thinking about the human. We should not see 
this simply as linguistic hair splitting, believing that the great writers of Renais-
sance, Enlightenment, or modern humanism meant to include women when they 
wrote 'man'. Too often t hey did not. Humanist 'man' was conceptualized from the 
experience of male human beings; it is about forms of power, thought, agency and 
autonomy (not to mention access to education and therefore to the very activity of 
scholarship upon which humanism is founded) historically only accessible to men. 
However, as critical as feminism is of how humanism's philosophy of man 
kept women disenfranchized, it is important to see contemporary feminist the-
ory as part of a struggle to expand humanism's ideals with regard to individual 
autonomy and liberty rather than as an attempt do away with humanist ideals 
altogether. Like Marxism, feminism has had a double relationship to humanism, 
simultaneously launching a critical dissent from, and insisting on the broad legiti-
mating and application of, its central ideals about human individuality, autonomy, 
and agency. This kind of work, while often cast as post- or anti-humanist, ought 
to be understood as part of an evolving discourse within humanism about what it 
means to be human, and about what ought to be included in a humanities educa-
tion. Ir constitutes both a dissent from humanism, and an extension of its logic. 
Theory, critique, and critical thinking 
Linking theory to critique, and critique to critical thinking, not only makes intel-
lectual and historical sense. It makes strategic sense as well. Critical thinking is 
routinely cited as the single most important practical skill the humanit ies teach, 
yet, as I indicated earlier, it is often invoked with little attempt to define it. Many 
of the same people who are critical of the role of theory in the humanities are the 
same people who emph asize the importance of critical thinking, which means 
they are missing the fact that critical theory courses are some of the best courses 
in critical thinking we have in higher education. Seeing critical theory as training 
in critical thinking emphasizes the general utility of such courses, but it also helps 
add substance to a concept that is often invoked but rarely defined in discussions 
about higher education . For example, The Foundation for Crit ical Thinking out-
lines an approach to critical thinking that links it to the kind of theoretical think-
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ing associared with srrucruralism, deconstruction, and ocher social, cultural, and 
polirical rheories that challenge received dogmas and entrenched assumptions.•• 
For example, rhe foundation's mission statement declares that critical thinking 
cultivates 'intellectual discipline( ... ) self-reflection and open-mindedness; insist-
ing that it requires a break with 'automation and! fixed procedure' and embraces 
'radically different' forms of'thinking ( ... ] adaptable, more sensitive to divergent 
points of view'. And critical thinking is also tied explici tly to sociar changes under 
globalization. 
The world in which we now live requires ·that we continually relearn, that 
we routinely rethink our decisions, that we regularly reevaluate the way 
we work and live. In short, there is a new world facing us, one in which rhe 
power ( ... ] to regularly engage in self-analysis, will increasingly determine 
t he quality of our work, the quality of our lives, and perhaps even our very 
survival. 
This approach to critical thinking underscores its foundations in theoretical 
thinking and critique in disciplines across the humanities, but also to challeng-
ing, resisting, and rethinking those forms in the very act of using them. From this 
point of view you cannot have critical thinking without theory, for what's being 
subjected to critical thinking here are entrenched, naturalized professionalized 
assumptions and protocols. Critical thinking involves asking challenging ques-
t ions about ways of t h inking and conceptualizing problems that have become 
automatic and fixed. T his approach to critical thinking, which deal s with received 
concepts 'openmindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and 
assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequenc-
es; is strikingly in sync with the shorthand definition of theory Jonathan Culler 
provides. 'The main effect of theory: he points out, 'is the disputing of'common 
sense': common-sense views about meaning, writing, literature, experience'.'' The-
ory, from th is perspective, is a form of critical thinking that in challenging old, 
naturalized orthodoxies gets us to see that what we take to be 'common sense' 
explanations and assumptions are in fact theories. For 'theory; Culler explains, 
is an 'attempt to show that what we take for granted as "common sense" is in fact 
a historical construction, reflecting a particular theory that has come to seem so 
natural to us that we don't even see it as a theory'.16 
T heory in t he humanities, then, is not a distraction from what the humanities 
ought to be doing. Theory is central to what everyone believes the humanities 
ought to be doing: teach ing critical thinking. It is a way of thinking critically 
about humanism and the gap between what it advocates and who has benefited 
from what it advocates. And theory challenges students to think open-mindedly 
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in the context of divergent points of view about their core beliefs, to rethink and 
reevaluate rheir positions, and to entertain radically different forms of rhinking 
about !how meaning is produced, about the relationship between arr, philosophy 
and power, and about the relationship between class, gender, race, sexual orienta-
tion, and social justice. From this point of view theory, as it challenges tradition-
ally entrenched ways of doing intellectual and historical business, is an important 
vehicle for critical thinking and is thus central to the core m ission of the humani-
t ies. Indeed, it is one of the most concrete examples we have of teaching critical 
thinking. 
Conclusion 
To come back to the double argument I have been making, all of this means not 
only that theory ought not to be seen as a disnaction from what the humani-
t ies should be doing, but even more importanttly, that theory ought to be seen 
as central to both the history of humanism and the range of practical skills we 
teach in the humanities. We should not allow theory to become the scapegoat for 
what crit ics believe is w rong with the humanities. Indeed, we need to go beyond 
defending theory and actively argue for its centrality in the tradiitions of human-
ism we teach, and the contemporary humanities we increasingly have to defend. 
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